The emerging allegations about what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knew before October 7, 2023, demand something far more serious than another round of political finger-pointing.
They demand an accounting.
According to reporting originating with Haaretz and detailed by The Times of Israel, roughly 10 days before Hamas launched the deadliest attack in Israel’s history, United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed allegedly personally warned Netanyahu that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was preparing a major operation against Israel.
This was allegedly not a vague warning buried somewhere in an intelligence report.
According to the account, it was communicated directly to Israel's prime minister during a lengthy conversation with the leader of a friendly Arab state.
Netanyahu's office emphatically denies the allegation, saying no such warning was given and disputing that the reported conversation occurred during the period in question. That denial matters and must be investigated alongside the evidence supporting the allegation.
But if the reported warning is substantiated, the implications are staggering.
A Warning That Allegedly Reached the Top
The reporting is based in part on the forthcoming book Kidnapped: 843 Days of Abandonment, by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval.
According to the account, Sinwar had communicated through intermediaries that Hamas was preparing something extraordinary. The information eventually reached the Emirati leadership.
The reported warning became serious enough that bin Zayed allegedly contacted Netanyahu personally.
According to The Times of Israel, citing the Haaretz account, bin Zayed warned Netanyahu that Sinwar was preparing a major event that could result in bloodshed, destabilize the region and damage the Abraham Accords.
Netanyahu reportedly responded calmly, indicating that Israel had Gaza under control and was prepared for possible scenarios.
Ten days later, Israel was not prepared.
Hamas-led attackers breached Israel's defenses on October 7, killing about 1,200 people and taking 251 hostages. The attack triggered a devastating regional war whose consequences continue years later.
That sequence creates unavoidable questions.
What exactly was Netanyahu told?
When was he told?
Who else knew?
What did Netanyahu do after receiving the alleged warning?
And, critically, did he ensure that Israel's military and intelligence leadership understood its seriousness?
Security Leaders Reportedly Were Not Told
Perhaps the most consequential allegation is that Netanyahu did not pass the Emirati president's warning to the officials responsible for protecting Israel.
Former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar and former IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi told Haaretz that they had not been informed of the reported warning.
One former senior Shin Bet official told the newspaper that knowing about it could potentially have caused intelligence officials to reassess other information they had received regarding Sinwar.
That does not establish that October 7 would have been prevented. Intelligence agencies routinely receive fragmentary, ambiguous and sometimes deliberately misleading information.
But it raises a far more basic question:
Why would information important enough for the president of the UAE to personally raise with Israel's prime minister not be immediately placed before the country's senior security officials?
That question cannot responsibly be answered through partisan talking points.
It requires evidence.
There Were Other Warning Signs
The allegation becomes more significant when placed alongside other information described in the reporting.
According to The Times of Israel's account of the Haaretz investigation, intermediaries had already passed information connected to Sinwar to Israeli security officials during September. Israeli officials discussed the information but apparently did not interpret it as indicating an imminent Gaza invasion.
The report also says that on October 1, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar proposed possible proactive measures against Hamas leadership. Netanyahu reportedly requested proposals for consideration but made no immediate decision.
The new reporting therefore does not describe a single magical piece of intelligence that necessarily revealed the exact date, time and operational plan for October 7.
It describes something potentially more troubling: fragments of information accumulating while Israel's political and security establishment continued operating under assumptions about Hamas that proved catastrophically wrong.
The question investigators must answer is whether Netanyahu possessed an additional warning that could have changed that assessment — and, if so, why it apparently was not shared.
Netanyahu Denies It
There is another side to this story, and it must be stated plainly.
Netanyahu's office has rejected the allegations.
It initially characterized the report as a "total lie" and subsequently said that Netanyahu received no warning from the UAE before October 7. His office added that relevant intelligence, if it existed, would have been transmitted through established intelligence channels.
The UAE government has not publicly confirmed the reported conversation. Its Foreign Ministry said it does not comment on reports or speculation concerning conversations between leaders, while noting that the UAE and Israel maintain direct communications and that relevant intelligence is shared through appropriate channels.
However, The Times of Israel reported that an Emirati source familiar with the conversation confirmed that a warning was delivered during a call between the two leaders.
That creates a direct factual dispute.
And factual disputes of this magnitude are precisely why an independent investigation is necessary.
Put Everyone Under Oath
October 7 should not be investigated according to whether the evidence helps Netanyahu's supporters or his opponents.
Investigators should obtain phone records, diplomatic communications, intelligence assessments, meeting minutes, security briefings and contemporaneous notes.
Officials with direct knowledge should testify.
The alleged intermediaries should be interviewed.
Israeli intelligence officials should explain what they knew and when.
The UAE should be asked to provide whatever records it can lawfully disclose concerning the reported communication.
And Netanyahu himself should be required to give a complete account of what information reached him before October 7 and what he did with it.
The objective should not be to manufacture guilt.
It should be to establish responsibility.
The Prime Minister Cannot Be Exempt From Scrutiny
Israel's military and intelligence institutions have already faced intense scrutiny over their failures preceding October 7. Senior security officials have acknowledged failures, and several senior figures have left their positions.
Political leadership cannot reasonably be placed beyond the same examination.
A prime minister cannot claim ultimate authority when national security policy succeeds and then insist that responsibility belongs exclusively to intelligence officers and generals when the system catastrophically fails.
If Netanyahu never received the warning described in the new reporting, an independent investigation can establish that.
If he received it but reasonably concluded it was unreliable, investigators should establish that too.
If he transmitted it through other channels, those records should be produced.
But if evidence ultimately establishes that the prime minister personally received a warning from the president of the UAE that Hamas was preparing a major operation and failed to ensure that Israel's security leadership acted upon it, Israelis deserve to know exactly why.
October 7 was not an abstract policy failure.
People were murdered in their homes and communities. Soldiers and civilians were killed. Hundreds were taken hostage. Families were shattered. The attack unleashed a war that devastated Gaza and transformed the Middle East.
With consequences that enormous, "who knew what, and when?" is not merely a political question.
It is an obligation to history.
The allegation against Netanyahu remains disputed. It should neither be dismissed because it is politically damaging nor accepted as proven because it is politically explosive.
It should be investigated.
Documents should be produced. Witnesses should testify. Contradictions should be confronted. Evidence should determine what happened.
And wherever that evidence ultimately leads, accountability should follow.
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